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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
forbidding only loud and raucous sound trucks and that these words conveyed
a sufficiently accurate concept of what was forbidden.
More than half of the Justices feel that the decision ili the Saia case has
been repudiated, despite the desire by the majority not to do so. The practical
effect of this decision is to indicate that only a municipal ordinanlce expressly
and unequivocally forbidding an%' amplification of speech whatsoever, would
be held invalid; but any words creating an ambiguity would remove the ordi-
nance from that category.
The more liberal thought evinced in the Saia case appears preferable.
The decision is not consonant with the modern trend toward expansion of civil
liberties. Fear of the possible abuse of a right is no excuse for its abrogation
or unreasonable abridgment.
LABOR LAW-PICKETING-LEGALITY OF OBJECT-
SELECTIVE HIRING OF NEGROES
'etitioners, as individuals and not as members of a labor union, requested
the "Lucky Stores" to engage in selective hiring of Negro clerks based on the
proportion of white and Negro customers who patronized the stores. The
requested hiring was to be made, as clerical vacancies became available,
through the Retail Clerks Union, with whom the stores had a union shop
contract. Upon refusal of their demands, the petitioners peaceably picketed
one of the stores with signs announcing, "Don't Patronize-Lucky Won't
Hire Negro Clerks In Proportion To Negro Trade." The store secured an
injunction against the pickets which the latter ignored. Adjudged guilty of
contempt, petitioners brought a writ of certiorari to annul the conviction.; Held,
conviction affirmed. Such picketing is for the unlawful object of establishing
an arbitrary and discriminatory hiring policy on a racial basis, thereby effecting
the equivalent of both a closed shop and a closed union in favor of the Negro
race. Hughes v. Superior Court in and for Contra Costa County, 198 P.2d 885
(Cal. 1948).
It is well established that peaceful picketing is guaranteed as an incident
of free speech by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution,' though many authors and judges have assailed picketing as extending
beyond mere free speech and as a weapon of coercion and intimidation.2
Peaceftl picketing is not permissive, however, if directed toward an unlawful
1. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940) ; Sen v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
2. 'ee McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmens' Local Union, 16 Cal.2d 311, 106
P.2d 373, 395 (1940) (dissenting opinion) I TFaLIE, LABOR DisetuEs AND COLLECTIVE
IARGAINI-4G § 136 (1940).
CASES NOTED
or illegal objective;;' for the right to carry on business, be it called liberty
or property, has value, and to interfere with this right without just cause is
unlawful."
The Taft-Hartley Act--, bans the closed shopY Within the jurisdiction
of the act picketing for this objective would therefore be unlawful.7 Many
states have outlawed closed shop agreements by statute,s but, in the absence
of such legislative actiou, it is established that the closed shop is valid and not
against public policy." Where the closed shop is valid, picketing for the purpose
of obtaining a closed shop is allowed." An early case, upholding the closed
shop, warned that a union which had such an agreement with the employer
would open itself to serious criticism if it refused to admit additional qualified
men to its membership."1 It is now well settled that a closed shop plus a
closed union,' 2 is not a legitimate objective of labor.' 3 The possibility of
monopoly and interference with the employment opportunity of outsiders
inherent in closed shop agreements, coupled with the rights and powers given
to labor unions under existing laws, justify this result. 4
The picketing of a store by Negro non-employees to secure employment
3. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926); Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine
Operators, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941); Retail Clerks Union v. wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board, 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W.2d 698 (1942).
4. Dorchy v. Kansas, supra.
5. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1947).
6. Closed shop-requires all employees, as a condition of employment, to become and
remain members of the contracting union, and requires management to hire union mem-
bers only, whether or not through the contracting union. TELLR:. A LABOR POLICY FOR
AMERICA 130 (1945).
7. 49 STAT. 449 t1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq. (1947) ["(a) It shall
be an unfair labor practice-
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization
.... Provided further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination against any em-
ployee for non membership in any labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds
for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms
and conditions generally applicable to other members .... .
8. 1 TELLER, LAB3OR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 170 (1948 Supp.).
9. Shafer v. Registered Pharmacists Union, 16 Cal.2d 374, 106 P.2d 403 (1940).
10. Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Greenwood, 249 Ala. 265, 30 So.2d 696
(1947) ; Park and Tilford Import Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 27
Cal.2d 599, 165 P,2d 891 (1946); McKay v. Retail Automobile Salesmen's Union, 16
CaI.2d 311, 160 P.2d 373 (1940). Contra. Colonial Press v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d
1 (1947) ; Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E.2d 1 (1943).
11. See Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 121 N.E. 790, 792 (1919).
12. A closed union is commonly defined as one which arbitrarily denies admittance to
qualified workers.
13. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944) ; Schwab v. Mov-
ing Picture Machine Operators, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P.2d 600 (1941); Wilson v. Newspaper
and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938) ; accord, Thompson
v. Moore Drydock Co., 27 CaI.2d 595, 165 P.2d 901 (1946) ; Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d
746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944) ; Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U.S.
248 (1944).
14. TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 29 (Cum. Supp. 1946).
But see Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U.S. 248, 271 (1944)
("whether the closed shop with or without the closed union should or should not be per-
mitted without supervision is in the domain of policy making, which is not for this court
to undertake.")
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for members of their race constitutes a labor dispute.' 5 Prior cases have held
that a closed shop contract could not be made by a union which arbitrarily
excluded Negroes solely because of their color,' or other qualified persons 17
from membership. This court has extended the decisions of these former cases
by holding that the Negro race constitutes a closed union. The words of the
court are not necessarily confined to this one race, but would appear to apply
to all races, Because race and color are inherent qualities, those persons who
are born with such qualities constitute among themselves a closed union which
others cannot join. Thus, if the store had yielded to the demands of the
petitioners in this case, its hiring policy would have constituted, as to a propor-
tion of its employees, the equivalent of both a closed shop and a closed union
in favor of the Negro race. As to this proportion of jobs, a qualified worker
of any other race though a union member, could not have been hired. Therefore,
the picketing was properly enjoined.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - VALIDATION OF BOND ISSUE
The City of Fort Lauderdale, Florida petitioned to obtain a decree validat-
ing an issue of recreational revenue bonds, the proceeds to be used for the
purpose of acquiring lands and constructing a municipal recreation center
thereon. The principal and interest were to be payable solely from the revenue
of the recreational facilities, and froin the proceeds of a utilities service tax.
A freeholder's election, apparently required by the Florida Constitution,' had
not been conducted. From a judgment for the City, the intervenor appealed.
Held: Judgment affirmed. No election by the freeholders was required because
the pledging of utility taxes is permitted by statute.2 These bonds do not consti-
15. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938) (the desire
for fair and equitable conditions on the part of persons of any race or color and the
removal of discrimination against them by reason of their race and religion is quite as
important to those concerned as conditions of employment can be to any labor organiza-
tion).
16. Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal.2d 586, 165 P.2d
903 (1946) (employer may be enjoined from indirectly assisting in carrying out dis-
criminatory practices against Negroes through a closed shop contract) ; Thompson v.
Moore Drydock Co., 27 Cal.2d 595, 165 P.2d 901 (1946); cf. Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal.2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1944) (if the worker meets the
conditions imposed, the union must accept him for membership or give up its demands for
a closed shop).
1. F.A. CONST. Art. IX, § 6 ("... and the Counties, Districts or Municipalities
of the State of Florida shall haie power to issue bonds only after the same shall have
been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a majority of
the freeholders who are qualified electors residing in such Counties, Districts, or
Municipalities shall participate, to be held in the manner to be prescribed by law . . .).
2. Fla. Laws Spec. Acts of 1947, c. 24514, § 1 (4) [". . . and to pledge the revenue
derived from any such facility (recreational) or any other available funds to pay and
discharge any bonds which might have been issued in connection with securing moneys
to construct or improve such facilities"] (italics ours).
